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Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law. By 
Ran Hirschl. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.  320 pp. $45.00 cloth. 
 




As the epigraph to one chapter in his impressive volume, 
Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law, Ran 
Hirschl offers the following exchange between the archaeologist Howard 
Carter and his patron, Lord Carnarvon, on Carter’s entry into 
Tutankhamun’s tomb: “Can you see anything?”  “Yes, wonderful 
things!” The epigraph might aptly frame the volume as a whole.  
Hirschl’s ambition is to seize a pivotal moment in the development of 
comparative constitutional scholarship and to help those engaged in the 
field to see more and better.  There is a tone of excitement and affection 
in the pages, born of the recent and rapid global spread of 
constitutionalism and judicial review, which has been accompanied by a 
marked growth in scholarly – and juridical – interest in comparative 
constitutional study.  Hirschl sees the scholarly possibilities attendant on 
such a moment and regards the comparative constitutional enterprise as 
poised to enrich our understanding of modern constitutional life.   
 
And this enthusiastic tone is accompanied by one of concern 
because, as Hirschl sees it, the field of comparative constitutional study is 
currently afflicted by “a fuzzy and rather incoherent epistemological and 
methodological matrix” (5), a shortfall in self-understanding that 
prevents the scholarly enterprise from realizing its potential.  In 
particular, the range and variety of approaches that are collected under 
the mantle of comparative constitutional study has deprived us of a clear 
view of what the character of the “comparative” project is and ought to 
be, and of a refined sense of what methods are well calibrated to its ends.  
In this volume, Hirschl seeks to address this weakness by drawing the 
reader through the contemporary quandaries and intellectual history of 
comparative constitutional inquiry and charting out a kind of 
methodological desiderata for the field.    
 
Indeed, the heart of Comparative Matters is a plea for comparative 
constitutional study to be more energetically and resolutely 
interdisciplinary, engaging, in particular, with the social sciences and 
empirical methods.  The latter half of Hirschl’s book is dedicated to this 
methodological call, with Chapter 4 urging a shift from comparative 
constitutional “law” to comparative constitutional “studies,” signalling 
an enterprise more closely tied to the contextual focus of the social 
sciences and less anchored to conventional forms of legal analysis.  One 
need not wholly concur with Hirschl that the style of constitutional 
reflection in the legal academy is quite so thin on such social and political 
framing to nevertheless profit from his account of why deeper 
engagement with the social sciences and its methods would enrich the 
field of comparative constitutional study.  In Chapter 5 and 6 Hirschl 
examines key methodological tensions that must be reckoned with for 
the field to continue to develop (the universal v. particular and critiques 
from the “global south”) and offers a set of principles and 
methodological rules.  In these latter pages, Hirschl sets out principles of 
case selection in small-N comparative studies and advocates for the 
greater use of large-N empirical studies.  Hirschl is not sanguine about 
such studies, carefully noting the limits and risks involved.  But he is 
insistent that research method must be calibrated to research aim and 
that if one aspires to meaningful causal claims or explanatory theories, 
such well-crafted studies are important arrows in the comparative 
constitutionalist’s quiver. 
 
The force of these methodological arguments rests, however, on 
the work that Hirschl does in the first half of the book. The first three 
chapters, each fascinating and erudite, appear vastly different in their 
focus and character.  Chapter 1 addresses the currently salient issue of 
top courts citing the constitutional jurisprudence of foreign countries.  
Hirschl offers a helpful and extensive review of the practice, complete 
with an illuminating case study of Israel.  Chapter 2 turns to “pre-
modern religion law” and explores the ways in which religious 
communities managed engagement with the constitutive laws of societies 
in which they lived or came into contact, presenting these examples as 
early instances of comparative constitutional engagement.  In Chapter 3, 
the reader is given an intellectual history of comparative constitutional 
inquiry, reaching back to the mid-16th century and Jean Bodin, and 
galloping forward through thinkers like Selden, Montesquieu, Bolívar, 
arriving at a comparison between contemporary Canadian and US 
juridical practices.   
 
  What unites these apparently divergent chapters is their common 
insistence that a court’s, community’s, scholar’s, or polity’s practices of 
comparative constitutional inquiry are motivated and shaped by forces 
that lie outside of the purely legal.  Patterns in the judicial citation of 
foreign law, Hirschl argues, are more about the politics of identity 
construction than divergences on legal principle.  The deep history of 
comparative constitutional law revealed in the lives of religious 
communities shows that feelings of vulnerability or security, social and 
economic needs, political economy, and practical exigency are the chief 
determinants of adaptation to and borrowing from the constitutive law of 
others.  And, in Hirschl’s hands, the intellectual history yields the lesson 
that comparative constitutional reflection is driven by a trio of 
motivations: necessity, inquisitiveness, and politics.  Although not cast in 
this manner, I read these chapters as jointly exposing and disrupting the 
pathologies of formalism, presentism, and parochialism that afflict too 
much comparative constitutional work. As he insistently pushes us into 
the theological, the social, the historical, and the political to understand 
the nature of constitutional comparison, Hirschl establishes his case that 
a genuinely interdisciplinary approach is not just appealing but 
imperative.  Having been so pushed, where can we turn for richer 
understanding but to the social sciences (and, I would add, humanities)?  
Recall Hirschl’s complaint about the current epistemological and 
methodological foundations for the field.  By enriching the 
epistemological terrain for understanding comparative constitutional 
practices in the first part of the book, Hirschl establishes the case for his 
methodological ambitions. 
 
  Comparative Matters leaves us at the threshold of certain important 
issues of (appropriately) both an epistemological and methodological 
nature.  In his desire to shine a light on the social, economic, and political 
factors that influence practices of comparative constitutionalism, Hirschl 
tends to narrow and ossify concepts that those working in socio-legal 
studies might prefer to expand and destabilize.  For example, having 
explained the various political factors that influence judicial choices to 
cite foreign constitutional law, Hirschl concludes that “[t]hese choices are 
sociopolitical, not juridical” (43).  Similarly, the destination of his 
intellectual journey through comparative law is the statement that 
“ultimately attitudes toward the ‘laws of others’ reflect social processes, 
political ideologies, and national meta-narratives that are broader than 
the constitutional sphere itself” (13).  Seeing the perduring influence of 
social, political, and identity-based factors on comparative constitutional 
practice, perhaps the more constructive move would be to expand our 
sense of the juridical task (as one always involving decisions about 
community identity) and of what is encompassed by the “constitutional 
sphere”.  Methodologically, as Comparative Matters moves into its final 
chapters, the range of the imagined interdisciplinarity seems to narrow, 
focussing on empirical social sciences and leaving aside Hirschl’s own 
earlier and illuminating engagement with theology, philosophy, and 
literature evident and so fruitful in the early chapters of this book.  The 
choice is understandable, given the less mature state of scholarship that 
takes seriously case selection and large-N research design principles; and 
yet one can hope that Hirschl’s book will inspire a similarly careful 
consideration of the methodological rules and approaches appropriate to 
the humanistic engagement with comparative constitutionalism. 
 
 Comparative Matters is an ambitious, learned, and provocative 
book that succeeds in contributing to a more sound and productive 
foundation for the field of comparative constitutional studies.  With this 
volume, Hirschl again marshals his impressive range and vision as a 
scholar 1  to advance our understanding of constitutionalism and, this 
time, to help us to think more deeply about the character of the 
comparative constitutional enterprise.  Otherwise put, as a comparative 
constitutionalist, this book will help you to see “wonderful things.”   
                                                 
1 See, e.g., his earlier volumes, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the 
New Constitutionalism (Harvard, 2004), and Constitutional Theocracy (Harvard, 2010). 
